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REVIEWABILITY OF REMAND ORDERS: STRIKING
THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF EQUALITY RATHER
THAN JUDICIAL EXPEDIENCY
Jerome I. Braun*
I. THE ISSUE
A federal district court order denying remand to state court is
reviewable on appeal. An order granting remand (with limited ex-
ceptions) is not. Can this distinction be rationalized or justified? The
thrust of this article is that it cannot.
II. AN OVERVIEW
The Constitution does not explicitly provide defendants with an
absolute right to remove state court actions to federal district court.
Nonetheless, such a right has been recognized by Congress since the
enactment of the original Judiciary Act in 1789.1 This statutory
right of removal is the mechanism by which federal district courts
exercise the original jurisdiction granted to them under Article III of
the Constitution.2
In spite of the obvious importance of the right to a federal fo-
rum in certain cases, by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (hereinafter
"section 1447(d)"), Congress has severely circumscribed the ability
of defendants to establish that jurisdiction properly lies in federal
district court. Denying any review of orders remanding removed ac-
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Although the views expressed here are solely those of the author, this Article is an out-
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1. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 79-80 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1988)).
2. See generally Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 271, 272 (1872).
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tions to state court effectively sabotages the mechanism and frustrates
important federal policy.
There is a paucity of legislative history or expression of con-
gressional intent respecting the public policy supposedly furthered by
the interdiction of section 1447(d). It has been judicially declared,
however, that its purpose is self-evident and clear: to prevent pro-
longed litigation concerning jurisdictional questions from unnecessa-
rily interrupting and delaying the progress of a lawsuit.' Clearly ar-
ticulated or not, this ascribed congressional concern for judicial
efficiency and expediency creates a needless and unfair judicial
imbalance.
Although the avoidance of unnecessary delay is always a legiti-
mate legislative and judicial concern, that concern must be balanced
against the interests that are sacrificed when review of remand or-
ders is completely precluded. The interest sacrificed by Congress'
''no review" policy is access to a federal forum in cases where Article
III establishes original jurisdiction in the federal judicial system.
Whatever may be said about the merits of diversity jurisdiction,4
where removal is based upon the arguable presence of a federal
question, non-reviewability of remand orders compels defendants to
suffer the possibility of adverse judgments by state court judges less
familiar with federal law. This problem is compounded by the fact
that defendants have virtually no access to a federal forum in which
to challenge such judgments.'
The thesis here is that the policy underlying this principle of
3. In Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court noted: "There is no doubt that in order to prevent delay in the trial of
remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues . . . Congress immunized from
all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds specified in § 1447(c)
.(citations omitted).
4. This Article does not address the continuing diversity jurisdiction controversy except
to the extent that it may explain hostility towards removal of diversity cases and the afortiori
antagonism towards appellate review of orders remanding such cases to state court. For the
latest word on this subject, see FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TENTATIVE RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (1989). (This committee, appointed by United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, suggested that further restrictions on ordi-
nary diversity jurisdiction are necessary.) Similarly, this Article acknowledges but does not
address what Judge Spencer Williams has characterized as "an unarticulated bias against the
'expansion' of removal jurisdiction . . . [that is not] grounded in logic [or] commonsense."
Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F. Supp. 88, 492
(N.D. Cal. 1981).
5. The only federal recourse defendants have is a petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. The statistical improbability of such review, however, is well
known. For example, according to the Clerk's Office of the United States Supreme Court, of
the 5,268 petitions that were filed in 1987, only three percent were granted.
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non-reviewability-judicial expediency-is secondary to the more
compelling concern that federal district courts fully exercise the ju-
risdiction granted to them by the Constitution and by Congress. This
is particularly true in cases where the jurisdiction of federal district
courts is founded upon the presence of a question "arising under"
federal law. In order to ensure that this concern is addressed, section
1447(d) should, at the very least, be amended to permit expeditious
review of remand orders in federal question cases. Statistical evi-
dence indicates6 that such an amendment would only slightly affect
judicial efficiency and expediency. Additionally, this amendment
would afford removing litigants with a federal forum in which to
present federal questions, and permit federal district courts more
fully to exercise the jurisdiction granted to them by the Constitution
and by Congress.
III. THE CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME
The right of defendants to remove certain actions from state
court to federal district court has been recognized by Congress con-
tinuously since 1789. Orders remanding such actions, however, did
not become reviewable until 1875 when Congress specifically pro-
vided for the review of remand orders by a writ of error or appeal.7
Twelve years later, in 1887, Congress reversed course, explicitly
stating that no appeal or writ of error would be allowed from deci-
sions remanding cases to state court.8 The state of the law concern-
ing the reviewability of remand orders remained unchanged until
1948, when the original version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 was enacted.9
6. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
7. Judiciary Act, ch. 137, § 5, 18(3) Stat. 472 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d) (1988)). Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1875 provided, in relevant part: "[T]he
order of [a circuit court of the United States] . . . remanding [a] cause to the State court shall
be reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the case may be."
8. Judiciary Act, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 553 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
(1988)). Section 2 of the Judiciary Act of 1887 provided that if a circuit court decided that a
cause was improperly removed and, therefore, remanded the cause back to the state court,
"such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error . . .
shall be allowed."
9. The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988) provides in its entirety:
(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district court may issue all
necessary orders and process to bring before it all proper parties whether served
by process issued by the State court or otherwise.
(b) It may require the petitioner to file with its clerk copies of all records and
proceedings in such State court or may cause the same to be brought before it by
writ of certiorari issued to such State court.
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure
must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under
1990]
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As originally drafted, section 1447 provided for remand of cases from
federal district court to state court, but did not contain a provision
prohibiting review of such orders.'0 One year later, Congress added
subsection (d) to section 1447. Section 1447(d) currently provides:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except
that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title [pertaining to
removal of civil rights cases] shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise."1
Pursuant to section 1447(d), with one limited exception," or-
ders remanding cases to state court and depriving defendants of a
federal forum in which to litigate federal questions are unreviewable
even if clearly erroneous.3 Therefore, by enacting section 1447(d),
Congress expressly granted federal district courts virtually non-re-
viewable power, presumably in the interests of judicial economy and
efficiency, to deprive defendants of their statutory right to have fed-
eral district courts adjudicate federal questions.
section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order
remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of
the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court.
The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title
shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose join-
der would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.
10. 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.169 [2.-11 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
12. Section 1447(d) expressly excepts cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443
(1948) from its "no review" rule. Section 1443 generally allows a defendant to remove cases in
which state action has denied him or her "equal civil rights." For a thorough discussion of this
exception, see Markowski, Remand Order Review After Thermtron Products, 4 U. ILL. L.F.
1086, 1095-99 (1977).
13. See Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When and How Federal Trial Court Re-
mand Orders are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 405 & n.48 (1987). The reviewability of
remand orders is also discussed in Rible, Federal Courts: Review of the Remand Order, 9 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 274 (1970); Myers, Federal Appellate Review of Remand Orders: Expansion or
Eradication?, 48 Miss. L.J. 741 (1977); Markowski, supra note 12; MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 10, 0.169 et. seq.; 14 A. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3739 et seq. (2d ed. 1985).
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IV. THERMTRON: A TOOTHLESS EXCEPTION TO THE "No
REVIEW" RULE OF SECTION 1447(d)
In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,'4 the United
States Supreme Court created a very narrow judicial exception to
section 1447(d)'s sweeping prohibition against review of remand or-
ders. In Thermtron, two Kentucky residents filed suit in a Kentucky
state court against Thermtron Products, Inc., an Indiana corpora-
tion, for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Asserting
that the federal district court had original diversity jurisdiction over
the case, Thermtron Products petitioned the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for removal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1441.' The federal district court subsequently re-
manded the case on the basis that its docket was overcrowded, that
other cases had priority on available trial time, and that the plain-
tiffs' right of redress would be severely impaired if the case were
permitted to stay in federal court." Thermtron Products then filed a
petition for an alternative writ of mandamus or prohibition in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, asserting that
the federal district court had no authority to remand the case on such
grounds. 7 The Sixth Circuit denied Thermtron Product's petition
for two reasons: (1) the federal district court had jurisdiction to enter
the order of remand; and 2) the Sixth Circuit had no jurisdiction to
review that order or to issue mandamus because of the broad prohi-
bition against review of remand orders set forth in section 1447(d). 8
Justice White, writing for five members of the Court, re-
versed. 9 The majority said sections 1447(c) and (d), when read to-
gether, require that federal district courts remand cases for one of
the two reasons specifically enumerated in section 1447(c).2" Unless
a remand order is expressly issued on the basis of one of those two
reasons, section 1447(d)'s prohibition against review of remand or-
ders is inapplicable.2 ' The Court noted that the federal district court
judge in Thermtron did not expressly assert that it was remanding
the case to Kentucky state court pursuant to section 1447(c) or that
the case was "improvidently removed" or the federal district court
14. 423 U.S. 336, 337 (1976).
15. Id. at 338.
16. Id. at 340-41.
17. Id. at 341.
18. Id. at 341-42.
19. Id. at 345.
20. Id. at 345-46.
21. Id. at 345.
19901
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was "without jurisdiction."22 Accordingly, the Court held that sec-
tion 1447(d) did not apply.2" If, however, the trial court had simply
uttered the shibboleth of section 1447(c) and purported to remand
the case on such grounds, its order would have been totally immune
from challenge by appeal, mandamus or otherwise. 4 This ritualistic
reliance on boilerplate statutory language elevates form over sub-
stance and, in effect, renders Thermtron's exception virtually
toothless.25
V. THE "No REVIEW" RULE OF SECTION 1447(d) HAS LED
To CLEARLY UNFAIR AND ERRONEOUS DECISIONS IN THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Section 1447(d)'s blanket prohibition on reviewability of re-
mand orders has led to some egregious decisions in the lower federal
courts which are difficult to reconcile with any sense of even-handed
justice.2 6 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has rigidly applied section
1447(d) to deny review of virtually all remand orders even where
those orders have been clearly erroneous. A fairly recent example of
the sometimes startling effect of section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule is
Seedman v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia."' The plaintiff in Seedman filed a complaint in state court, al-
22. Id. The terms "improvidentaly removed" and "without jurisdiction" were in the
then-existing version of section 1447(c), which, in its entirety, provided:
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed im-
providently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case,
and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand
shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may
thereupon proceed with such case.
For the current language of section 1447, see supra note 9.
23. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345.
24. Id. at 345-46.
25. See Herrmann, supra note 13, at 409-10 ("Because Thermtron was read to insulate
remand orders from review either if they were based on grounds set out in section 1447(c) or if
they simply invoked the language of that section, lower courts declined to review remand or-
ders that invoked the 'magic words' of Section 1447(c).") (emphasis in original). See also My-
ers, supra note 13, at 754 ("The courts have generally declined to review remand orders which
do not fall within the narrow legalisms of Thermtron."). In an exhaustive analysis of Therm-
iron, the Court in Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) held reviewable
a remand order based on a waiver of the right to remove. The Court made clear that if the
magic words of section 1447(c)-"improvidently removed" or "without jurisdiction"-had
been used, the remand order would have been non-reviewable.
26. See generally Myers, supra note 13, at 745-50. These types of decisions "clarify the
indispensable need for appellate review of remand orders in all litigation and provide a com-
pelling argument for amendment of the removal statutes to explicitly provide for such redress."
Myers, supra note 13, at 745.
27. 837 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1988); But see Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63, 65-
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leging federal RICO violations against multiple defendants.28 The
defendants subsequently petitioned for removal to federal district
court." The district court sua sponte remanded the case to state
court on the grounds that the removal petition was untimely."0 After
the district court's remand order had been certified to the state court,
the defendants filed a second removal petition, asserting that the
original remand order was based on a clerical error."1 Plaintiff then
moved to remand the case to state court for a second time. The dis-
trict court denied the motion and vacated its earlier remand order,
concluding that the first remand order had been based on a clerical
error.
3 2
After the district court denied the plaintiff's second remand mo-
tion, the plaintiff petitioned the Ninth Circuit for mandamus on the
ground that the district court had been without jurisdiction to recon-
sider its original remand order. 3 The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding
that so long as a remand order is purportedly based on section
1447(c), neither an appellate court nor the district court that issued
the order has the power to vacate or correct it.3 4
The result in Seedman is disturbing. A case over which a fed-
eral district court clearly had original federal question jurisdiction
(and which, in fact, had been properly removed) was remanded to
state court.3 5 The defendants in Seedman, therefore, were forced to
litigate a substantial federal question in state court even though they
were clearly entitled to have that question adjudicated by the federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. While there are, and may
always be, wrongs without remedies, the result in Seedman is diffi-
cult to reconcile with any notion of procedural fairness.
VI. THE INHERENT INCONSISTENCIES OF SECTION 1447(d)
In addition to resulting in unfair and erroneous decisions, sec-
66 (3d Cir. 1989). In Air-Shields, the Third Circuit reviewed a district court order remanding
the case to state court under the 1982 version of section 1447(c), rather than the recently
amended 1988 version. In order to justify its decision to review the district court's order and
avoid what clearly was an erroneous and unjust ruling, the Third Circuit relied upon a
refreshingly liberal reading of Thermtron's exception to section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule.
28. Seedman, 837 F.2d at 413.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 414.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
1990]
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tion 1447(d) itself is inherently inconsistent. It expressly prohibits
review of orders granting motions to remand, but by clear implica-
tion permits review of orders denying remand." There is no logical
reason for making this rather arbitrary distinction. In fact, unless the
judicial system is willing to concede that a plaintiff's right to the
forum of its choice is more vital or important than a defendant's
right to a federal forum in which to litigate substantial federal ques-
tions, a conclusion that this Article expressly rejects, the distinction
made by section 1447(d) makes no sense."
Indeed, in reality, permitting review of an order denying re-
mand can result in even more serious delay, interruption and dupli-
cation of effort than permitting review of an order granting re-
mand. 8 For example, in La Chemise LaCoste v. Alligator Co.,
Inc.," the Third Circuit ruled, after a complete trial on the merits
in federal district court, that the district court had improperly denied
the plaintiff's remand motion."' For that reason, the Third Circuit
vacated the district court judgment, remanded the case to the district
court, and ordered the district court to remand the case to the state
court. ' The state court, therefore, was required to relitigate the en-
tire matter.
In addition to being inherently inconsistent, the inflexibility of
section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule has inspired lower federal courts
to fashion further judicial exceptions to its sweeping prohibition.
These exceptions, which technically are mechanisms of avoidance,
have led to irrational inconsistencies. For example, the Ninth Circuit
has developed two additional exceptions to section 1447(d)'s "no re-
view" rule. First, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 1447(d)
does not preclude review of remand orders which are premised on a
"substantive decision on the merits apart from any jurisdictional de-
36. See supra note 9. See also Capital Bancshares, Inc. v. North Am. Guar. Ins. Co.,
433 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 246 n.13
(1970) (noting that federal question removal jurisdiction intended to provide a federal forum
for protection of federal rights and to encourage the development of expertise by the federal
courts in the interpretation of federal law).
38. If a district court refuses to remand a case to state court, that decision is reviewable,
absent certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982), only on appeal from a final judgment. See,
e.g., Sheeran v. General Elec. Co., 593 F.2d 93, 97 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979). See also Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1158, 1160
(5th Cir. 1989).
39. 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 346.
41. Id. at 347.
[Vol. 30
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cision. ' '"2 Second, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a decision
remanding pendent state law claims to state courts is also reviewable
because it is a matter of discretion rather than a matter governed by
section 1447(c).48
By creating these two exceptions, the Ninth Circuit has amelio-
rated some of the one-sidedness of section 1447(d)'s "no review"
rule. Consequently, it has clearly contravened both the explicit lan-
guage of the statute and the stated public policy underlying the rule.
The Ninth Circuit has apparently created these exceptions in an ef-
fort to bring some judicial balance, however modest, to the current
statutory scheme by effectively narrowing section 1447(d)'s severe
proscription. Indeed, although the Ninth Circuit has posited no
pragmatic rationale for why these exceptions should not fall within
the harsh ambit of section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule,"' one could
42. See Schmitt v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 F.2d 1546, 1550 (9th Cir. 1988);
Clorox Co. v. U.S. District Court, 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Invs., Inc. v.
Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 276 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Regis Assocs. v.
Rank Hotels (Management) Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1990); Kolibash v. Commit-
tee on Legal Ethics of W. Va. Bar, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989); Peabody v. Maud Vancor-
tland Hill Schroll Trust, 89 D.A.R. 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that notwithstanding sec-
tion 1447(d), a remand order which also imposed sanctions for frivolous removal required
some examination of the merits of the removal and the remand). See generally Herrmann,
Reviewing the Unreviewable, 6 CAL. LAW. 75 (1986).
Although this exception presumably was crafted to soften rather than accentuate the
harshness of section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the excep-
tion rather narrowly and, in doing so, has raised a somewhat troubling resjudicata question:
"Does a federal district court, in the course of deciding whether Congress has completely pre-
empted a select group of state law claims, render a "substantial decision on the merits apart
from any jurisdictional issue" that falls within the exception?"
Two different Ninth Circuit appellate panels have recently addressed this question. In
Hansen v. Blue Cross, No. 88-5910 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Cal. file),
the panel acknowledged that the district court's decision might effectively preclude the defend-
ant from raising preemption as an affirmative defense in state court. The Hansen court held,
however, that the state court "must determine the propriety of extending resjudicata effect to
[the] district court's . . . decision" in light of the fact "that [the district court's decision], by
statute, is immune from appellate review even if clearly wrong." Id. If the state court decides
that the district court's decision should be given res judicata effect, so be it. In such a case,
section 1447(d) would preclude the defendant from seeking appellate review of a decision on
the merits of an affirmative defense.
In Whitman v. Raley's Inc., 886 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1989), the court simply defined this
troubling resjudicata issue away. According to the Whitman court, the "jurisdictional issue of
whether 'complete preemption' exists is very different from the substantive inquiry of whether
a 'preemption defense' may be established." Because the issues were not identical, the appel-
late court concluded that the district court's ruling concerning "complete preemption," "[had]
no preclusive effect on the state court's consideration of the substantive preemption defense."
43. Schmitt, 845 F.2d at 1550 (citing Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 276). Cf Rothner v. City of
Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989).
44. Although technically speaking, one can argue that under the current statutory
scheme only "strictly jurisdictional" remand orders are non-reviewable and, therefore, that
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argue that these exceptions implicitly suggest and support the need
for procedural change. Surely a defendant's right to litigate substan-
tial federal questions in a federal forum is equally, if not more im-
portant than that same defendant's right to litigate pendent state law
claims in such a forum."4
On the other hand, a rational and practical reason arguably
does exist for distinguishing between cases in which the original ju-
risdiction of a federal district court is based on diversity of citizen-
ship, rather than the presence of a federal question. First, it is highly
unlikely that a federal district court will erroneously decide whether
diversity of citizenship exists or whether the minimum amount in
controversy requirement has been met.46 Therefore, the need for re-
view of remand orders based upon such determinations is likely to be
insignificant. 41 Second, by permitting state court judges to decide fed-
eral questions, federal district courts frustrate, rather than facilitate,
the formation of a uniform, interpretive body of federal law.48 Ac-
cordingly, this Article proposes that section 1447(d) be amended to
provide for expeditious review of remand orders only in federal
question cases.49
these exceptions are "jurisprudentially sound," see, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 42, such an
argument misses the point. The point is that these exceptions nevertheless serve to undermine
Congress' stated purpose in making remand orders non-reviewable and, therefore, should be
treated no differently than "strictly jurisdictional" orders. It is not what the Pelleport court
characterized as the "substantive decision on the merits" that is appealable. Pelleport, 741
F.2d at 276. It is the remand order itself.
45. Pelleport, 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984).
46. See Herrmann, supra note 13, at 414 (noting that the presence or absence of diver-
sity is a threshold question readily resolved by reference to a well-established body of law). See
also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (illustrating the
complexity of deciding whether a particular case "arises under" federal law). But see Herr-
mann, supra note 13, at 414 (arguing that after Merrell Dow, the issue will be much simpler).
47. Congress recently amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) and, in doing so, narrowed the
bases of diversity jurisdiction. See Cirillo, Judicial Inprovements and Access to Justice Act:
Significant Changes in the Laws Governing Removal, Diversity, and Operation of Federal
Courts, 11 Civ. LIT. REP. (CEB) 14, 16 (1989). Specifically, Congress: (1) increased the
amount in controversy requirement from $10,000 to $50,000; (2) provided that citizenship in
representative party cases shall be determined by reference to the represented party; and (3)
provided that permanent resident aliens shall be treated as citizens of their state of domicile.
Id.
48. See Markowski, supra note 12, at 1106, 1109 (stating that "nonreviewability of
remand orders prevents the development of a body of uniformly applied law on removability"
and "federal question jurisdiction facilitates the formation of a uniform body of interpretive
law"). See also supra note 5.
49. The Author would not oppose a broader proposal making all remand orders review-
able. The need for review of federal question remand orders and the lack of any significant
need for review of diversity remand orders, however, impels the not entirely logical but prag-
matic distinction made here.
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VII. PROVIDING FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS
IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES WILL NOT OVERBURDEN THE
APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM
By amending section 1447(d) to permit review of remand orders
in federal question cases, Congress would undoubtedly cause an in-
crease in the caseload of federal appellate court judges. The critical
question, however, is by how much? The most recent statistical evi-
dence indicates that the resultant increase would be relatively insig-
nificant in light of the importance of providing defendants with a
federal forum in which to litigate substantial federal questions. Ac-
cording to the Statistical Analysis and Reports Division of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts,50 in 1988 a total of
21,221 cases were removed from state courts to federal district courts
in the twelve federal judicial circuits.5 Of those cases, approximately
3,106 (14.5%) were remanded to state court. Of the 3,106 cases that
were remanded to state court, approximately 1,218 (39% of the
14.5% remanded) were originally removed based upon the alleged
presence of a federal question.
Consequently, if section 1447(d) is amended to permit review of
such cases by a customary three-judge panel, the workload of each
active circuit court judge would increase by, at the very most, ap-
proximately twenty-four appeals per year. This projection assumes
the worst case scenario in which all remand orders would be ap-
pealed and senior status judges would not share any of the increased
appellate burden. If senior status judges shared the increased appel-
late burden equally, the number would decrease to approximately
seventeen appeals per year. This relatively insignificant increase is
not a disproportionate price to pay for the assurance that federal
courts would decide all federal questions that are properly presented
50. The statistics reported in this Article were prepared with the help of the Statistical
Analysis and Reports Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Although these
statistics are not published by the Administrative Office in the form reported in this Article,
the raw statistical data is available from the Author upon request.
51. The statistical evidence with respect to 1988 is not aberrational. In 1986, 17,776
cases were removed from state courts, 2,602 of which (14.8%) were eventually remanded. Of
those 2,603, 931 (35.8%) were originally removed based upon the alleged presence of a federal
question. Similarly, in 1987, 19,966 cases were removed from state courts, 2,874 of which
(14.4%) were eventually remanded. Of those 2,874, 1,021 (35.5%) were originally removed
based upon the alleged presence of a federal question. Had remand orders in federal question
cases been reviewable in 1986 and 1987, the workload of appellate judges would have in-
creased, on average, by approximately 19.4 and 21.3 cases per year respectively. Moreover, if
senior status judges had shared the increased burden equally, those numbers would have de-
creased to 13.9 and 14.9 respectively. Finally, if section 1447(d) had permitted single-judge
review, those numbers would have decreased even further to 6.5 and 7.1 respectively.
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to them.52
In the event that this relatively modest increase proves unac-
ceptable, however, section 1447(d) can and should be amended to
provide for single-judge review. Although such an amendment would
conflict with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27"8 and several
similar local rules,54 there is nothing in the Constitution that would
prohibit the adoption of such a procedure. If a single judge, as op-
posed to a customary three-judge panel, were permitted to review
federal question remand orders, the workload of active circuit court
judges would increase by a maximum of approximately eight appeals
per year rather than twenty-four. Moreover, permitting single-judge
review of federal question remand orders would almost certainly de-
crease the time within which the review itself could be completed.
Instead of requiring a consensus among three appellate court judges,
the appeal could be decided more expediantly by a single judge.
The following table, utilizing statistics from 1988, illustrates
what the effect of such an amendment would be on each of the
twelve judicial circuits, assuming that senior status judges are not
required to carry any of the increased caseload resulting from the
amendment.
52. The author is not insensitive to characterizing a workload increase as "insignifi-
cant." The streamlined procedures discussed at pages 91-93 of the text, however, may make
this characterization more fair and accurate. While the author believes that the increase in
appellate court workload resulting from reviewing federal question remand orders is "rela-
tively insignificant," candor requires recognition-of the fact that the subsequent reversal of
federal question remand orders may further increase the workload of both the district and
circuit courts. For example, if a case is remanded to state court, it is unlikely that it will later
return to the federal court system. If the order of remand is reviewed and then reversed, how-
ever, the district court will hear the case and any appeal thereafter will be filed in the circuit
court.
53. FED. R. App. P. 27(c) provides:
In addition to the authority expressly conferred by these rules or by law, a
single judge of a court of appeals may entertain and may grant or deny any
request for relief which under these rules may properly be bought by motion,
except that a single judge nay not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or
other proceeding, and except that a court of appeals may provide by order or
rule that any motion or class of motions may be acted upon by the court. The
action of a single judge may be reviewed by the court.
(emphasis added).
54. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 27(0; 5TH CIR. R. 27(2); 8TH CIR. R. 5(b).
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Increased No. Increased No.
of Appeals of Appeals
Total Cases Percentage of Per Judge Per Judge
Remanded Cases Re- (Assuming (Assuming
No. of Active Total Cases Total Cases (Federal manded (Fed- Three-Judge Single-Judge
Circuit Judges Removed Remanded Question) eral Question) Panel) Review)
DC 11 72 7 4 57 1.9 .4
1st 6 556 52 17 33 8.5 2.8
2d 12 1,031 93 45 48 11.2 3.7
3d 12 1,635 224 87 39 21.7 7.2
4th 11 1,587 133 44 33 12.0 4.0
5th 15 4,085 545 179 33 35.8 11.9
6th 14 2,760 334 168 50 36.0 12.0
7th 11 1,141 146 58 40 15.8 5.3
8th 9 1,349 180 97 54 32.3 10.8
9th 25 3,688 977 390 40 46.8 15.6
10th 10 1,199 129 34 26 10.2 3.4
11th 12 2,118 286 95 33 23.7 7.9
Total 148 21,221 3,106 1,218 39.2 24.7 8.2
VIII. SUMMARY APPELLATE PROCEDURES CAN BE USED To
MINIMIZE DELAY
The additional burden placed on appellate court judges by the
proposal made in this Article would be relatively slight in light of
the benefits derived from review of federal question remand orders.
Nevertheless, in order to reduce the resulting burden and to mini-
mize the potential for abusive delay,5" various summary appellate
procedures could be employed."
For example, because review of remand orders generally will
require resolution of a single discrete legal issue, both the time in
which review of this nature must be sought and the length of the
briefs that must be filed in support or opposition could be diminished
appreciably.57 Furthermore, the review itself could be accomplished
55. The delay inherent in the review process will in all likelihood be mitigated some-
what by the recent statutory amendments to the laws governing removal. See Cirillo, supra
note 47, at 15-16 (motions to remand on the basis of a defect in removal must now be filed
within 30 days after filing of the notice of removal, and removal of a case on diversity grounds
must be made within one year after commencement of the action).
56. Summary procedures already exist in a number of circuits for the disposition of
appeals that are frivolous or without merit. See, e.g., 6TH CIt. R. 9; 10TH CIR. R. 8. The
Ninth Circuit utilizes such procedures although they are not expressly formalized in court
rules or procedures.
57. FED. R. ApP. PRAC. 31(a) provides:
The appellant shall serve and file a brief within 40 days after the date on which
the record is filed. The appellee shall serve and file a brief within 30 days after
service of the brief of the appellant. The appellant may serve and file a reply
brief within 14 days after service of the brief of the appellee, but, except for
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without oral argument.58 In addition, section 1447(d) could be
amended to provide for mandatory monetary sanctions-including
the payment of actual expenses, costs and attorneys' fees-in cases
where the request for review "is not well-grounded in fact," "war-
ranted by existing law," or "interposed for any improper purpose."59
good cause shown, a reply brief must be filed at least 3 days before argument. If
a court of appeals is prepared to consider cases on the merits promptly after
briefs are filed and its practice is to do so, it may shorten the periods pre-
scribed above for serving and filing briefs, either by rule for all cases or for
classes of cases, or by order for specific cases.
(emphasis added).
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Practice 31(a), circuit courts could enact rules
decreasing the time within which the appellant must file its brief to 20 days, and the time
within which the appellee must file its brief to 15 days. No reply brief should be permitted.
Similarly, Federal Rules of Appellate Practice 28(g) could be amended or rules could be
enacted to limit the length of principal briefs to 20 pages, exclusive of pages containing the
table of contents, tables of citations, and any addendum containing statutes, rules, and
regulations.
58. Federal Rules of Appellate Practice 34(a) currently provides for oral argument in
the majority of cases. Rule 34(a) specifically provides:
Oral argument shall be allowed in all cases unless pursuant to local rule a panel
of three judges, after examination of the briefs and record, shall be unanimously
of the opinion that oral argument is not needed. Any such local rule shall pro-
vide any party with an opportunity to file a statement setting forth the reasons
why oral argument should be heard. A general statement of the criteria em-
ployed in the administration of such local rule shall be published in or with the
rule and such criteria shall conform substantially to the following minimum
standard:
Oral Argument will be allowed unless
(1) the appeal is frivolous; or
(2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively decided;
or
(3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and
record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument.
Federal Rules of Appellate Practice 34(a) must be amended either to prohibit oral argu-
ment in all remand order cases or permit courts of appeal to promulgate rules to that effect.
Cf FED. R. APp. PRAC. 1 (a) (permitting courts of appeal to shorten briefing periods in partic-
ular cases).
That it is possible to expedite appellate review of remand orders is graphically illustrated
in Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989). In Air-Shields, defendant filed a
petition for writ of mandamus on April 13, 1989, seeking an order directing the district court
to vacate its remand order. In accordance with the Third Circuit's local rule 12(6), the Court
of Appeals, without hearing oral argument, rendered its order to vacate the remand order on
December 7, 1989-a mere eight months after the petition was filed. With tight briefing
schedules the review could, no doubt, be compressed even more.
59. In other words, parties seeking review of remand orders should be subject to Rule
11 standards, but not necessarily Rule 11 sanctions. See Falconer & Herrmann, Legislation
Enacted in November Alters Law Governing Removal, NAT'L L.J. 18 (1989) (noting the
difference between Rule 11 sanctions and the sanctions provided for in the newly amended
version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
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Finally, the appellate court, in its discretion, could permit further
pretrial proceedings in the federal district court, including discovery,
to continue during the pendency of the review.60
IX. CONCLUSION
Avoidance of undue delay is a legitimate judicial and legislative
concern. That concern, however, must be balanced against the inter-
ests sacrificed when appellate review of remand orders is denied: the
interest of access to a federal forum in cases where Article III estab-
lishes original jurisdiction in the federal judicial system. Where re-
moval jurisdiction is based upon the asserted presence of a federal
question, non-reviewability of a remand order compels the defendant
to suffer the possibility of an adverse judgment by a state court on
the federal question.
The defendant, of course, has no recourse to a federal tribunal,
other than filing a seldom granted petition for writ of certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court. Commenting upon similar perils
faced by litigants in circumstances where a federal district court in-
correctly abstains from deciding issues presented to it, the Supreme
Court noted in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Ex-
aminers61 that:
There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a liti-
gant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal
District Court to consider federal . . . claims can be compelled,
without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept
instead a state court's determination of those claims. Such a re-
sult would be at war with the unqualified terms in which Con-
gress, pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred
specific categories of jurisdiction upon the federal courts ....
The inconsistent and irrational results occasioned by application
of section 1447(d)'s "no review" rule are similar to those occasioned
by the now obsolete "derivative" jurisdiction rule created by the
United States Supreme Court in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balti-
more & Ohio Railway Co."3 The Lambert rule of "derivative" juris-
60. Markowski, supra note 12, at 1110. See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 418 (1969).
61. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
62. Id. at 415.
63. 258 U.S. 377 (1922). The Lambert rule of "derivative" jurisdiction provided that
since removal jurisdiction is derived from the state court, if a state court lacked jurisdiction
over a case, a federal court did not acquire jurisdiction upon removal even if it would have had
jurisdiction had the suit originally been filed there. Accordingly, the district court could only
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diction was repeatedly criticized for its inexplicable results. Judge
Duniway pointedly observed:
[T]his is the kind of legal tour deforce that most laymen cannot
understand . . . One would have thought that the purpose of
removal . . . is to get the case . . . into the court that has juris-
diction, and to keep it in [that] court, so that it can be tried and
a valid judgment can be entered. 64
Appellate review of remand orders in federal question cases
would ensure that those cases which are properly removed to federal
court stay there. The proposal made in this Article attempts to mini-
mize the inevitable increase in appellate court caseload, and the po-
tential for abusive, tactical delay on the part of removing parties.
These goals can be achieved by making review of such remand or-
ders as efficient and expeditious as possible while, at the same time,
providing the removing litigant a limited, but important right to ap-
pellate review of remand orders in federal question cases.
dismiss the action. Id. at 382. The Lambert "derivative" jurisdiction rule was squarely over-
turned by Congress in 1986 with the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e).
64. Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658-
59 (9th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original).
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